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MARIO D’AMATO
Rollins College

BUDDHISM, APOPHASIS, TRUTH

A

ccording to a common trope in Buddhism, Buddhist teaching—the
dharma—is a raft: it is to be used to cross over the expanse of suffering,
but when the other shore is reached, the raft should be left behind.1 Such
self-abrogating doctrines are not entirely unusual in Buddhist discourse, and
indeed may be seen in other religious and philosophical traditions as well. One
author has creatively referred to any philosophy which aims at “its own demise”
or employs the “dialectics of self-erasure” as uroboric.2 The image here is that of
the uroboros, the serpent which swallows its own tail, an image found in
medieval alchemical texts. A paradigmatic example of an uroboric philosophy
may be seen in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, when he states:
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he
has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so
to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)3
The doctrinal move towards self-abrogation has of course also been referred to as
apophasis. Michael Sells explains that:
Apophasis can mean “negation,” but its etymology suggests a
meaning that more precisely characterizes the discourse in
question: apo phasis (un-saying or speaking-away). . . . Any
saying (even a negative saying) demands a correcting
proposition, an unsaying.4
In these terms, an apophatic discourse is one which ultimately abrogates,
negates, or “unspeaks” itself. Apophasis is often understood to be a technique
1 For example, in the Alagaddūpama Sutta the Buddha states, “So I have shown you the
Dhamma is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose
of grasping”; see tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length
Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), p. 229.
2 John Visvader, “The Use of Paradox in Uroboric Philosophies,” Philosophy East and West
28 (1978), p. 455.
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 189.
4 Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), pp. 2-3.
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employed by negative theology, a theology which “denies that the transcendent
can be named or given attributes.”5 The Russian philosopher Nicolas Berdyaev,
however, defines apophasis as “knowledge in the process of discarding all
notions and determinations.”6 On this account apophasis is not understood to be
a technique for indirectly approaching an ineffable absolute, but is, rather, a form
of discourse which aims to “speak-away” all forms of discourse, including its
own. For the purposes of this paper, I will understand an apophatic discourse or
doctrine as one which makes such a self-abrogating move through employing the
“dialectics of self-erasure,” and I will use the term apophasis(B) to refer to this
particular form of apophasis.7 In this paper I will offer some reflections on one
instance of apophasis(B) in a specific Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrinal treatise,
known as the Madhyāntavibhāga (“Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes,”
ca. fourth century CE). I will attempt to formally distinguish such apophatic(B)
doctrines from doctrines of ineffability, and consider what apophatic(B) doctrines
might contribute to the impasse regarding “truth” which characterizes certain
approaches to the comparative philosophy of religion. Since this paper is
intended as a contribution to the comparative philosophy of religion, I will begin
with a few remarks on the nature of that enterprise.
On the Comparative Philosophy of Religion
The comparative philosophy of religion may be understood to encompass a
number of different tendencies in the interpretation and analysis of non-Western
philosophico-religious systems. Perhaps in its most basic sense, the comparative
philosophy of religion refers to the project of comparing non-Western
philosophy (philosophies, philosophers, philosophical texts, concepts, theories,
etc.) to Western philosophy. In the present context this would mean conducting
nuanced and philologically rigorous comparative studies of Buddhist philosophy
alongside Western philosophy. Such a project might be carried out for the
purposes of identifying patterns in form (forms of reasoning and argumentation)
and/or content (concepts and theories, e.g., of God, the self, etc.) among the
differing philosophical traditions.
Wilhelm Halbfass points out that a
comparative approach to the study of religion has a long and distinguished
history in the Western tradition:
In the days of their early historians like Herodotus, the Greeks
compared their own traditions with those of the Orient; al-Bīrūnī
and others compared the Hindus with the Greeks and with their
own Muslim tradition; and deists like Herbert of Cherbury
compared various religious traditions in order to determine their
universally valid common denominators.8

5 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, tr. George Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles,
Centenary Press, 1938), p. 33.
7 The use of the superscript (B) is intended to indicate that I am using Berdyaev’s
definition of apophasis, especially as applied to Buddhist discourse.
8 Wilhelm Halbfass, “India and the Comparative Method,” Philosophy East and West 35
JCRT 9.2 (2008)

D’Amato: Apophasis 19

Halbfass also indicates, however, that “comparison as such does not appear as an
explicit, consciously utilized method” until the end of the eighteenth century,
and was more clearly formulated in the nineteenth century.9 And the idea of
applying the comparative method specifically to the study of philosophy became
more widespread after P. Masson-Oursel’s La philosophie comparée (published in
French in 1923, and in English in 1926, with the title Comparative Philosophy).10
Whether or not such comparative projects ought to be carried out—and if so, in
what way—is of course open to debate. According to one line of critique, the
categories employed in comparing diverse systems tend to be rigidly imposed,
resulting in a loss of nuance which may be fundamental to the philosophical
doctrines, texts, or systems being interpreted. Nevertheless comparative
research is an important step in developing typologies or classification schemes
for forms of philosophy. And in any approach to the philosophy of religion, at
least a minimal classification scheme is unavoidable: judgments regarding just
what phenomena are to be considered to fall under the rubric of “philosophy” or
“religion” are predicated upon prior determinations regarding just what the
parameters of these concepts are understood to be. And as J. Z. Smith points out,
these parameters are formulated from the perspective of Western scholarship:
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars
for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It
is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in
establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as
“language” plays in linguistics or “culture” plays in
anthropology. There can be no disciplined study of religion
without such a horizon.11
Classifying phenomena—at least in some preliminary way—is necessary to any
approach to the study of phenomena, and the comparative analysis of
phenomena is an important stage in their classification. And even if—according

(1985), p. 3.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 4. Note that while Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion discusses nonWestern traditions, it does so in terms of the architectonic of Hegel’s system. Hodgson
points out that Hegel’s “threefold division of the philosophy of religion reflects this
logical structure (concept of religion, determinate religion [including Buddhism],
consummate religion [viz., Christianity]), as do the subdivisions of each of these main
parts” (Peter C. Hodgson, “Logic, History, and Alternative Paradigms in Hegel’s
Interpretation of the Religions,” Journal of Religion 68 [1988], p. 5). Regarding Hegel’s
views on comparative philosophy of religion, Halbfass comments that “European
thought, as Hegel sees it, cannot return to Oriental or Indian thought, and they cannot
be equated or paralleled with one another. They are not on the same level and cannot
be compared in the full sense of the word 'comparison'” (Halbfass, “India and the
Comparative Method,” p. 8).
11 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Critical
Terms for Religious Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 281-282.
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to certain self-abrogating apophatic(B) discourses at least—classification schemes
are ultimately to be left behind, this can only be achieved by starting within the
scheme itself (within the “disciplinary horizon” in Smith’s terms), a scheme at
least partially constituted by comparative analyses of phenomena. Hence
employing at least some typology or classification scheme seems to be
indispensable, even if only for the purposes of critique.
According to another line of thought, the comparative philosophy of religion
means studying non-Western philosophy—here, Buddhist philosophy—with an
acute awareness of the linguistic, conceptual, theoretical, and cultural
presuppositions through which we engage in such study. We cannot help but
approach non-Western traditions comparatively—at least for those of us who
were educated primarily in a Western cultural environment, through Western
languages, Western regimes of education, traditions of thought, etc. On this
account, being comparative is in some sense a precondition for our approach to
Buddhist philosophy. Matthew Kapstein states:
[A]s Dilthey taught us long ago, understanding must be ever
constituted on the basis of prior understanding, and to step
altogether out of our skins is an impossibility for us. If we
cannot eliminate the conceptual background engendered by our
time, place, and personal circumstances, we can, however, with
sufficient care, discern some of the ways in which our vision is at
once constrained and enabled by it.12
In these terms, any approach to Buddhist thought is intrinsically comparative,
and we become more open to allowing Buddhist thought to disclose itself to the
extent that we make our linguistic, conceptual, and cultural dispositions clearer
to ourselves. B. K. Matilal adds that “anyone who wants to explain and translate
systematically from Indian philosophical writings into a European language will,
knowingly or unknowingly, be using the method of 'comparative philosophy.'”13
Hence engaging in self-reflexive comparative analyses of one’s own
philosophical presuppositions vis-à-vis the presuppositions of, say, Buddhist
philosophical discourse, is a necessary preliminary for any rigorous
interpretation of Buddhist thought. Furthermore, through making our own
philosophical commitments clearer to ourselves, the self-reflexive practice of the
comparative philosophy of religion might open a way for actual philosophical
engagement with non-Western systems of thought, and allow for the possibility
of shifting our own approach to philosophy itself.
Some have extrapolated from the comparative philosophy of religion into the
domain of cross-cultural philosophy of religion. Cross-cultural philosophy of
12 Matthew Kapstein, “What Is Buddhist Philosophy?,” Reason’s Traces: Identity and
Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001),
p. 3.
13 B. K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The
Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 13.
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religion refers to the project not of comparing different traditions of thought, but
of bringing them into conversation with one another. Jay Garfield states that
cross-cultural philosophical understanding:
[I]s actualized in the interaction between historically situated
readers and texts, and between interlocutors. This is no less true
of inter-traditional understanding than it is of intra-traditional
understanding. Only by engaging in such actual interactions can
we hope to benefit. . . And in dialogue the dynamic interplay of
our horizons can yield a perspective genuinely responsive to the
presuppositions and insights of each.14
Garfield discusses the interlocking hermeneutic circles of text, tradition, and
reader, and recommends the “radically pragmatic turn” of not focusing on texts
as the abstract objects of “disembodied minds,” but engaging with texts “inbeing-read, or in-being-explained.”15 Understood in this way, we might view
cross-cultural philosophy of religion as an extension and further transformation
of comparative philosophy of religion. Through such open-ended conversations
across traditions we maintain the hope of arriving at the pragmatist ideal of
truth, namely the “opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate”16—a hope which must remain the very precondition for philosophy
as such. In a previous paper I explored one way in which semiotics (theory of
signs)—especially in the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce—might be brought
into conversation with certain strands of Buddhist thought.17 In the next section,
I will extend some of the ideas developed in that earlier paper in order to
introduce some background themes necessary for understanding the
Madhyāntavibhāga’s apophatic(B) doctrine.
Three Entrances to NirvāGa
According to a Buddhist doctrine found even in the Pāli canon—the canonical
collection containing some of Buddhism’s earliest extant texts—there are three
entrances to nirvāṇa: emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness (śūnyatā,
apraihita, and animitta). We may briefly explain these three as follows: one may
attain the highest goal through realizing that all phenomena are empty of
inherent nature (emptiness), through relinquishing any form of craving for
phenomena (wishlessness), and through eliminating any signs of phenomena
(signlessness). In his Buddhist Thought in India Edward Conze offers an extended
discussion of these three entrances to nirvāṇa, or “doors to deliverance.” He
14 Jay L. Garfield, “Temporality and Alterity: Dimensions of Hermeneutic Distance,”
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 250.
15 Ibid., pp. 237 and 233.
16 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” in James Hoopes (ed.), Peirce
on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1991), p. 177.
17 Mario D’Amato, “The Semiotics of Signlessness: A Buddhist Doctrine of Signs,”
Semiotica 147 (2003), pp. 185-207.
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states, “It will be noted that the concentration on emptiness concerns ontology,
wishlessness pertains to the volitional sphere, and the signless belongs to the
domain of epistemology.”18 While this is a simple sketch, for the present
purposes we may consider it to be not far off the mark—although I would
characterize discourse on wishlessness as concerning philosophical psychology,
and discourse on signlessness as concerning theoretical semiotics.19
Conze provides a synthetic account of how signlessness is understood in
Buddhism, describing semiosis in terms of a three-stage process of noting the
sign, recognizing the object to which the sign refers, and becoming volitionally
engaged with the object. He states:
The task is to bring the process back to the initial point, before
any “superimpositions” have distorted the actual and initial
datum. The seemingly innocuous phraseology of the formula
which describes the restraint of the senses [through the
concentration on signlessness] opens up vast philosophical
vistas, and involves a huge philosophical programme which is
gradually worked out over the centuries in the Abhidharma and
Prajñāpāramitā.20
According to Buddhist semiotics, there is a significant sense in which semiosis
itself is systematically deceptive, binding one further to cyclic existence.
According to Buddhist metaphysics, conditioned phenomena—phenomena
which comprise “the world,” including whatever we refer to as “the self”—are
radically impermanent and without inherent nature or essence. Signs, on the
other hand, function to posit stable entities where there are none, affixing
inherent natures onto hypostatized existents. While phenomena are in flux,
signs posit enduring objects. While phenomena are without essence, signs posit
essential natures. Signs point to a realm of stable referents, but the purported
“objects” to which they refer are always on the move. So coming to a proper
understanding of semiosis, and bringing about its end or terminus through a
radical transformation, is understood in Buddhist traditions to be one of the very
“doors to deliverance.”
In the quote cited above, Conze identifies signlessness as a significant dimension
of Buddhist thought. Far from viewing Buddhist semiotics as ancillary to the
18 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1962), p. 68.
19 According to Buddhist doctrine these three entrances are understood to be intrinsically
related to one another, and to the entire edifice of Buddhist theory and practice. For
example, the Visuddhimagga (an important Theravāda Buddhist doctrinal compendium)
states that emptiness pertains to absence of self, wishlessness to unsatisfactoriness, and
signlessness to impermanence, wherein absence of self, unsatisfactoriness, and
impermanence are viewed as the universal characteristics of all conditioned
phenomena; see tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, The Path of Purification: Visuddhimagga (Seattle:
BPS Pariyatti Editions, 1999), pp. 680-681.
20 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 65.
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history and structure of Buddhist thought, Conze interprets it as a fundamental
aspect of the project of Buddhism, playing a role both in the Abhidharma—the
earliest fully articulated systems of Buddhist philosophy—and in the
Prajñāpāramitā or “Perfection of Wisdom” sūtras—the earliest genre of
Mahāyāna sūtra-literature. This is understandable insofar as according to certain
strands of Buddhist thought, the fundamental cause of suffering, or the
fundamental problem that must be overcome, is some form of conceptualization
(sajñā), conceptual discrimination (vikalpa), conceptual construction (parikalpa),
or conceptual proliferation (prapañca)21—in short, the fundamental problem is
some form of semiosis.
The Middle Way
We now turn to a brief reflection on a passage from the Madhyāntavibhāga, a
passage that may be understood as offering an apophatic(B) doctrine. Before
citing and commenting on the passage, a few remarks on the text itself are in
order. The Madhyāntavibhāga is a Buddhist treatise belonging to an early stratum
of the Yogācāra tradition, one of the main philosophical schools of Mahāyāna
Buddhism. The text was composed in Sanskrit probably ca. the fourth century
CE, and while I would not characterize the Madhyāntavibhāga as a text of
philosophy, I think it’s clear that the text engages with a number of philosophical
concerns. As with other Mahāyāna texts, the Madhyāntavibhāga’s ultimate
soteriological goal is the attainment of buddhahood, an attainment which is
understood in the Yogācāra tradition as a non-conceptual awareness (nirvikalpajñāna). The text presents the path to buddhahood, and the text’s subcommentator, Sthiramati (sixth century CE), offers an explanation of the
structure of the text. According to Sthiramati, the text begins with a discussion
of mental affliction and purification in terms of the concepts of “unreal
imagination” and “emptiness” (Chapter 1). Then in the next two chapters the
text discusses mental affliction in terms of a set of specific categories of
“obstructions” (Chapter 2)—mental factors which “obstruct” sentient beings
from seeing the way things really are and attaining liberation—and mental
purification in terms of the proper vision of “reality” (Chapter 3)—a vision
obtained through purification from the obstructions. In order to elucidate the
method of purification, the text then identifies the mental “antidotes” (Chapter
4), and their proper cultivation. Finally, since the path discussed thus far is
common to all Buddhists, including followers of the Hīnayāna (lit., “inferior
vehicle”), the text addresses the distinctive features of the Mahāyāna (lit., “great
vehicle”) (Chapter 5).
I broadly agree with Matthew Kapstein’s and Dan Arnold’s point that in trying
to understand just what these Buddhist thinkers are up to in composing such
texts, there’s much to be learned from Pierre Hadot’s interpretations of the
classical Western tradition in terms of “philosophy as a way of life.”22 According
21 Paul Williams, “Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka,”
Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980), pp. 1-45.
22 See Kapstein, “What Is Buddhist Philosophy?,” pp. 3-26; and Dan Arnold, Mīmāsakas
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to Hadot, in this tradition “philosophy was a way of life, both in its exercise and
effort to achieve wisdom, and in its goal, wisdom itself. For real wisdom does
not merely cause us to know: it makes us 'be' in a different way.”23 Doing
philosophy, on this account, is itself a form of “spiritual exercise.” As Arnold has
pointed out, we might most helpfully see the concepts and categories, the
accounts and arguments, offered in Buddhist doctrinal treatises not as detachable
pieces that might be employed in other contexts for other purposes, but rather as
part of the enculturation of a certain form of “mental discourse” (mano-jalpa),
internalizing a Buddhist vision of things—a point which appropriately echoes
the self-understanding of Buddhist doctrinal treatises as directed towards
attaining wisdom produced first through hearing, then reflecting upon, and
finally cultivating the teachings. On this reading, Buddhist philosophy is to be
understood as a form of Buddhist practice.
Returning to our text, we may now consider the specific passage. The text reads:
The extreme of conceptually discriminating (vikalpa) truth
(samyaktva) and falsity (mithyātva) is due to imagining the
analysis of existence (bhūta-pratyavekā) in terms of true and
false. To avoid these two extremes, there is the example of a fire
and two sticks. A fire is generated by two sticks that are not
themselves aflame; but when [the fire] has been generated, the
two sticks are consumed. Similarly, the true noble faculty of
wisdom [i.e., nonconceptual wisdom] is generated by an untrue
analysis of existence; but when [the noble faculty of wisdom] has
been generated, the analysis of existence is itself analyzed
(vibhāvayati). But the untrue analysis of existence should not be
[simply] characterized as false, since it is conducive to what is
true.24
This passage occurs in the context of a discussion of how the Mahāyāna properly
distinguishes the “middle” through avoiding a number of pairs of “extreme”
views25—a discussion which elucidates a brief section of an important Mahāyāna
sūtra, the Kāśyapa-parivarta. It is of course a common theme in Buddhist
discourse that the dharma is the “middle way” that avoids the extremes of
sensory indulgence and extreme asceticism, eternalism and annihilationism, etc.
The Madhyāntavibhāga takes up this theme and offers a new twist, articulating
that in the Mahāyāna all conceptual extremes are avoided through nonconceptualization. In fact, the term “middle way” (madhyamā pratipad) is itself

and Mādhyamikas against the Buddhist Epistemologists (University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss.,
2002), pp. 314-330.
23 Pierre Hadot, “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” Philosophy as a Way of Life, tr. Michael
Chase (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1995), p. 265.
24 The translation is my own; for the Sanskrit text, see Gadjin Nagao (ed.),
Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), comm. ad chap. 5,
v. 26.
25 Ibid., chap. 5, vv. 23-26.
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glossed as “nonconceptual awareness” (nirvikalpa-jñāna):26 the middle between
any pair of extreme views is achieved through the absence of
conceptualization—wherein one no longer conceptualizes either of the two
extremes at all. For our purposes, what is particularly interesting about the
present passage is that it characterizes both truth and falsity as extremes,
extremes that will be left behind (or consumed) by the (flames of the) “true noble
faculty of wisdom.” But this nonconceptual wisdom is itself arrived at through
the Buddhist analysis of the way things really are. So while the Buddhist
analysis of existence entails making a distinction between truth and falsity, when
this analysis is carried through to its ultimate conclusion—to the attainment of
the wisdom of buddhahood—the Buddhist analysis of things is itself consumed,
along with truth and falsity. In short, because the fundamental awareness of a
buddha is understood to be nonconceptual—not engaging with concepts and
language—the attainment of buddhahood precludes the possibility of positing
truth. But shouldn’t such a text concern itself with truth? Should all this be
understood as “just so much mystical nonsense?”
“Post-Mortem” Philosophy
It is generally understood that insofar as one is engaging in the philosophical,
rather than strictly just philological, study of texts from a non-Western tradition—
insofar as one is engaging in the comparative philosophy of religion—one should
be concerned with the question of truth. While philological rigor is certainly a
precondition for such studies, it is not the end of philosophical analysis: even
after one is satisfied that one has arrived at a proper understanding of the sense
of the text, there is still the question of whether one takes the text’s claims to be
true. But the question of truth is not easily resolved. Arnold offers a particularly
succinct account of the “problem of truth” when he states:
What sense are we to make of the fact that a great many
seemingly rational persons have ardently held, as really true,
religious beliefs that are often mutually exclusive? That question
becomes especially acute when we realize that our answer to it
cannot consist in simply jettisoning the idea of truth . . . for that
is an idea that itself is necessarily presupposed by our work as
scholars.27
In addressing this question, Arnold relies on a distinction between justification
and truth: while justification pertains to “the various circumstances in which a
person might be constituted as someone for whom certain beliefs are rationally
held,” the issue of “[h]ow and why the beliefs in question were thus developed
is, however, logically independent of whether or not they might be true.”28
26 Ibid., comm. ad chap. 5, v. 23.
27 Dan Arnold, “Justification and Truth, Relativism and Pragmatism: Reflections on
Indian Philosophy and Its Lessons for Religious Studies” (unpublished paper, 2006), p 1.
28 Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005), p. 213.
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Through employing such a distinction, we might “retain the relativist’s
recognition that many different (even mutually exclusive) beliefs might alike be
rationally held, but only if we also recognize that this point becomes incoherent
if understood as concerning the truth of beliefs,” and “appreciate, moreover, that
the possibility that [religious persons’] justified beliefs are really true may never
finally be eliminated.”29 If Arnold’s distinction is the right one to adopt, then the
conclusions of any comparative philosophy of religion can only inform us about
modes of justification, and cannot finally determine the truth of the claims
discussed. We may for example note that Buddhist thinkers and Western
empiricist philosophers offer similar accounts of the absence of self, and deploy
similar arguments in their defense, although all this could never in the end tell us
whether it is indeed true that there is no (essential, unchanging) self. But what is
true? Shouldn’t philosophy be concerned with the truth of the matter?
In connection with the distinction between justification and truth, we might also
consider Arnold’s comments regarding Hadot’s approach to the interpretation of
classical philosophy as a form of spiritual practice, “philosophy as a way of life.”
Arnold points out that such an approach leads us to see that Buddhist
philosophical discourse is based upon certain axiological commitments—certain
commitments to a hierarchy of values, values largely presupposed by Buddhist
philosophy rather than argued for. He calls our attention to
[T]he fact that these different traditions of discourse all make
clear the extent to which they presuppose various (and
sometimes mutually exclusive) axiological commitments, and
the fact that the ideal readers envisaged by these works will be
those who share these commitments. . . . [T]hose who engaged
religiously with the discourses . . . were doing something, were
performing some practice. . . . [and] none of the arguments . . .
surveyed provides good reasons for choosing to hold the beliefs
or undertake the practices in question.30
But where does this leave us with respect to the question of truth? Where does
that leave the comparative philosophy of religion? Are we at an impasse, unable
to finally adjudicate between competing systems of values?
It may be appropriate to characterize the present situation in terms of the
“postmodern condition.”
Jean-François Lyotard defines the postmodern
condition as “incredulity toward metanarratives,” and states that “the
obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most
notably, [to] the crisis of metaphysical philosophy.”31 Considering the problems

29 Ibid., pp. 216 and 218.
30 Arnold, Mīmāsakas and Mādhyamikas against the Buddhist Epistemologists, pp. 314-315.
31 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, tr. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p.
xxiv.
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associated with the legitimation of science, Lyotard states that the language game
of science:
[L]eaves behind the metaphysical search for a first proof of
transcendental authority as a response to the question: “How do
you prove the proof?” or, more generally, “Who decides the
conditions of truth?” It is recognized that the conditions of
truth, in other words, the rules of the game of science, are
immanent in that game, that they can only be established within
the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature, and that
there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus
extended to them by the experts.32
While Lyotard concerns himself with the “language game” of science, we might
transpose his account to our own domain, to describe the issues raised here in
the comparative philosophy of religion.
Without recourse to some
metanarrative, is it really possible to finally adjudicate between different
religious language games, e.g., the language games of Yogācāra Buddhism,
Gnosticism, or Lacanian psychoanalysis? Have we conceded the death of
philosophy? Have we conceded that in the postmodern condition, metaphysics
can only be replaced with “post-mortem” philosophy?
Apophasis: Philosophy as Therapy
Considering the impasse with respect to the question of truth in the comparative
philosophy of religion as highlighted above, we might reflect on whether
apophatic(B) doctrines might contribute to a resolution of the problem, or offer
another “way out.” It is first necessary, however, to distinguish apophatic(B)
doctrines from doctrines of ineffability.33 I will attempt to formally differentiate
the two forms of doctrine in terms of a Peircean model of semiosis. According to
Peirce’s tripartite model of semiosis, three elements are necessary for semiosis to
occur: the sign, the object, and the interpretant. Briefly, the sign is the
representation, the object is what is represented, and the interpretant is the
meaning of the representation—what Peirce defines as “the proper significate
outcome of a sign.”34 In these terms, a doctrine of ineffability should be
understood to primarily address the relation between sign and object: an
ineffability claim is a claim that some object x is unable to be expressed, a claim
32 Ibid., p. 29.
33 I should point out here that ineffability certainly plays a role in Buddhist discourse;
e.g., see José Ignacio Cabezón, “Ineffability and the Silence of the Buddha,” Buddhism
and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), chap. 9;
and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), pp. 90-97. Numerous other studies also examine the role
of ineffability in Buddhism; my aim in this paper, however, is to call attention to a
different aspect of Buddhist discourse.
34 See Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (eds.), Collected Papers of
Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol. 5,
para. 473.
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that the sign cannot properly refer to the object. An apophatic(B) doctrine, on the
other hand, should be understood to primarily address the relation between sign
and interpretant: an apophatic(B) doctrine indicates that the proper
understanding of the doctrine—the interpretant or meaning of the doctrine, the
doctrine’s “proper significate outcome”—entails a realization that the doctrine
must ultimately “unspeak” itself, that the doctrine does not function as a
description of the “way things really are,” but rather is only an instrument or
means to some further end: the end of “discarding all notions and
determinations.”35 It is certainly the case that doctrines of ineffability and
apophatic(B) doctrines both involve all three elements of Peirce’s model of
semiosis: the interpretant of a doctrine of ineffability is that the doctrine is unable
to properly signify the object, and the object of an apophatic(B) doctrine is the
doctrinal discourse itself. However, doctrines of ineffability are primarily
directed towards the sign/object relation; that is to say, they primarily concern
the domain of semantics. Apophatic(B) doctrines, on the other hand, are
primarily directed towards the sign/interpretant relation; they primarily concern
the domain of pragmatics. An apophatic(B) doctrine does not point out that
ultimate reality (or the ultimate nature of reality, or “the way things really are”)
is ineffable. Rather, an apophatic(B) doctrine aims to effect a shift in the status of
the given doctrinal discourse itself, and alter the practitioner’s relation to that
discourse. In short, the goal of apophasis(B) is to “unspeak” itself, to place the
doctrinal discourse under “self-erasure.”
The Buddhist tendency towards apophasis(B) may be seen in a number of places
in Buddhist discourse. The tendency may be seen, for example, in the trope of
the dharma as a raft, the view of the dharma as giving up all views, the claim
that Buddhist doctrine is like one illusory king defeating another, the statement
found in many Mahāyāna sūtras that the Buddha never uttered a word, the
Madhyamaka account of the ultimate goal as the cessation of all conceptual
proliferation (sarva-prapañca-upaśama),36 or the Madhyāntavibhāga’s claim that
when the Buddhist analysis of the nature of things has done its work it will itself
be consumed in the flames of non-conceptualization. In the passage from the
Madhyāntavibhāga discussed above, for example, the Buddhist characterization of
the way things really are is understood as an attempt to end all such
characterizations, including its own—offering an account of the way things
really are that will terminate any accounting for the way things really are. All of
this seems to quite clearly imply that when the goal is attained, even Buddhism
itself will not ultimately be taken to be true: when awakening is attained,
Buddhist doctrine is to be left behind. In the end, Buddhism should serve as a

35 Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, p. 33.
36 Kapstein states, “As the Madhyamaka teaching of emptiness, however, is sometimes
said to dispense with all expressed tenets, even this one, more nuanced readings favor
finding here a type of skepticism, specifically a skeptical view of the referential capacity
of language and conceptual activity. None of this seems to me to be wrong . . .
'emptiness' cannot be understood primarily in propositional, or 'theoretical' terms;
rather it fundamentally determines one’s orientation to the Buddha’s salvific project”
(Kapstein, “What Is Buddhist Philosophy?,” pp. 13-14).
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means of achieving the realization of signlessness, an attainment which dissolves
the possibility for affirming any truth at all.
Returning finally to the impasse regarding truth in the comparative philosophy
of religion, I would emphasize that apophasis(B) implies a conception of
philosophy as praxis more than theory, as more concerned with the cultivation of
spiritual realization rather than the statement of theoretical truths. An
apophatic(B) doctrine may, for example, be understood in terms of Wittgenstein’s
intuition that “All philosophy is 'Critique of language,'”37 although in offering
such “critique” one only has recourse to language itself—a predicament which
highlights the tension of self-abrogation driving apophatic(B) discourse. From the
perspective of apophatic(B) discourse, the impasse regarding truth may in itself
serve as a clue to the nature of our entrapment with the net of views, and a hint
that the ultimate goal entails moving beyond all views. In these terms,
philosophy is ultimately a form of therapy, and when the therapy has done its
work, it should be left behind, like a raft.
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